Petty Motor Lease, Inc. v. Masonry Equipment and Supply Co., a Utah Corporation; Del Lewis, an individual; and Red Ball Welding, Inc., a Utah Corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. v. Masonry Equipment and
Supply Co., a Utah Corporation; Del Lewis, an
individual; and Red Ball Welding, Inc., a Utah
Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph C. Petty; Attorney for Appellant.
L. R. Curtis, Jr.; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Petty Motor Lease Company v. Masonry Equipment Supply Company, No. 870484 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/674
r 4, i-j COUBT OF APP£Ak5> 
FU 
?io
 n 870 HSi 
'OCKET^p-h- c - p e t t y > 2 5 9 5 
Attorney at Law 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel. 363-8823 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THfi 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY 
CO., a Utah Corporation; DEL 
LEWIS, an individual; and RED 




•BU. 203311 — 
APPELLANT'S REPL* BRIEF 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorney for Appellant 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake Qity, Utah 84101 
L. R. Curtis 
Attorney for Respondents 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
OCT 2 81985 
Clerk, Sup-erne Ccur\ Uiah 
Ralph c. Petty #2595 
Attorney at Law 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel. 363-8823 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH|E 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY 
CO., a Utah Corporation; DEL 
LEWIS, an individual; and RED 




APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorney for Appellant 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
L. R. Curtis 
Attorney for Respondents 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF REFERENCES ii 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT NO. 1 
MESCO COMMITTED CONVERSION BY INTENTION-
ALLY EXERCISING DOMINION AND CONTROL 
OVER THE FORKLIFT WHICH SERIOUSLY 
INTERFERED WITH THE RIGHTS OF PETTY 
MOTOR 2 
A. CONVERSION OCCURRED UNDER FOUR 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND MESCO IS LIABLE FOR CONVERSION 
UNDER EACH 2 
1. MESCO COMMITTED CONVERSION WHEN 
IT PURCHASED THE FORKLIFT FROM 
C.S.&G. MASONRY 2 
2. MESCO CONVERTED THE FORKLIFT BY 
UTILIZING IT IN ITS RENTAL FLEET 10 
3. C.S.&G. MASONRY DEFAULTED ilN 
MAKING PAYMENTS UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE LEASE IN JANUARY, 1981 . 11 
4. MESCO CONVERTED THE FORKLIFT 
WHEN IT SOLD THE FORKLIFT TO 
REDBALL WELDING 11 
B. DEMAND AND REFUSAL IS NOT A CONDI-
TIONED PRECEDENT TO RECOVERY FOR 
CONVERSION . . . 12 
C. EQUITY AND JUSTICE REQUIRE THA^ 
PETTY MOTOR RECOVER FOR CONVERSION. 21 
CONCLUSION r • • 24 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 25 
APPENDIX 26 
TABLE OF REFERENCES 
CASES CITED 
PAGE 
1. Citicorp Homeowner's, 
Inc./ v. Western Surety Co., 
131 Ariz. 334, 641 P.2d 248, 
250 (1981) \ 5 
2. City Loan Company v. State 
Credit Association, 5 Wash. App. 
560, 490 P.2d 118, 120 (1971)
 f 14 
3. Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwait, 
8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 
P. 2d 1301 (1983) 12 
4. Crutcher v. Scott Publishing 
Co., 42 Wash. 2d 89, 253 P.2d 925, 
932-33 (1953) 15 
5. Culp v. Signal Van & Storage, 
142 Cal. App. 2d 859, 298 P.2d 
162, 164 (1956) 5 
6. Eade v. First National Bank, 117 
Ore. 80, 242 P. 832, 834 (1926) 6 
7. First National Bank of 
Highland v. Merchant's Mutual 
Insurance Co., 89 Misc.2d 771, 
392 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1977) 23 
8. Foster v. First National Bank 
of Missoula, 139 Mont. 396, 
365 P.2d 938 (1961) 15 
9. Gaylord v. Hoar, 122 Vt. 143, 
165 A. 2d 358, 362 (1960) 14 
10. Goodrich v. Malowney, 157 So. 
2d 829 (Florida 1963) 13 
11. Gowen v. Heider, 237 Ore. 
266, 386 P.2d 1, 19 (1963) i . 17 
ii 
• • 
12. Interstate Manufacturing Co. 
v. Interstate Products Co., 146 
Mont. 449, 408 P.2d 478, 481 (1965). 
13. Keegan v. Lenzie, 171 Ore. 194, 
135 P.2d 717, 721 (1943) 6 
14. Kolodney v. Kolodney Bros., Inc., 
21 Conn. Sup. 312, 154 A.2d 540, 
543 (1959) 16 
15. Lusitanian - American Development 
Company v. Seaboard Dairy Credit 
Corporation, 1 Cal. 2d 121, 34 
P.2d 139, 143 (1934) 5 
16. Mador v. Wagner, 70 S.W.2d 
794, 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 15 
17. Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 
548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976) 4 
18. Mastellone v. Argo Oil Corp., 
46 Del. 102, 82 A.2d 379, 384 (1951) . . . . 17 
19. McCrae v. Bandy, 270 Ala. 12, 
115 So. 2d 479, 483 (1959) 13 
20. McDaniel v. White, 140 Ga. App. 
118, 230 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1976) 13 
21. Mulin v. J.J. Quilan & Co., 195 N.Y. 
109, 87 N.E. 1078, 1080 (1909) 14 
22. Production Credit Association 
of Madison v. Nowatzski, 90 Wis. 
2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1979) . . . . 7, 
23. Satterfield v. Sunny Day Resources, 
Inc., 581 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Wyo. 1978) . . 6, 
24. Sturdevant v. First Security 
Bank of Deer Lodge, 606 P.2d 
525, 528 (Mont. 1980) 9 
25. Wyman v. Carrabassett Harwood 
Lumber Co., 121 Me. 271, 116 A. 




Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-311 (1953). . . 7, 24 
Utah Code Ann. §79A-9-503 4 
REFERENCES CITED 
Wexler, Rights and Remedies of the 
Secured Party After an Unauthorized 
Transfer of Collateral: A Proposal 
for Balancing Competing Claims in 
Repossession, Resale, Proceeds, and 
Conversion Cases, 32 Buf. L. Rev. 
373, 406 (1983) ,. 4, 5 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, §2(27 10 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, §229 9 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
P e t t y M o t o r a c c e p t s t h e s t a t e m e n t of t h e f a c t s s e t 
f o r t h by MESCO in i t s b r i e f e x c e p t fo r t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n 
i n p a r a g r a p h s 3 and 4 of t h e s t a t u s of t h e agreement between 
C . S . & G . M a s o n r y and P e t t y M o t o r . I n p a r a g r a p h 3 of i t s 
s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s , MESCO s t a t e s : 
. . . "At t h e t i m e of t h i s conveyance [of t h e 
f o r k l i f t f r o m C.S.&G. t o MESCO] C.S.&G. was no t in 
d e f a u l t on i t s agreement wi th P e t t y . (R. 76 ) " 
MESCO's p a r a g r a p h 4 of t h e s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s s t a t e s : 
" I n F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 1 , C.S.&G. d e f a u l t e d on i t s 
agreement wi th P e t t y . " 
P e t t y M o t o r a g r e e s t h a t a t t h e t ime C.S.&G. Masonry 
c o n v e y e d t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO, t h a t C.S.&G. Masonry had not 
d e f a u l t e d on i t s p a y m e n t s . L i k e w i s e , i n F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 1 , 
C . S . & G . M a s o n r y d e f a u l t e d on i t s p a y m e n t s w i t h P e t t y 
M o t o r , and no p a y m e n t s were made t h e r e a f t e r . P e t t y Motor 
c l a i m s t h a t C . S . & G . Masonry was in d e f a u l t under t h e te rms 
of t h e L e a s e A g r e e m e n t by convey ing th£ f o r k l i f t t o MESCO, 
b u t a d m i t s t h a t no d e f a u l t e x i s t e d in t h e payments a t t h a t 
t i m e . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A c o n v e r s i o n o c c u r r e d w h e n C . S . & G . M a s o n r y 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y conveyed the fork l i f t to MESCO, because th i s 
conveyance seriously interfered with Pqtty Motorfs dominion 
and c o n t r o l over the f o r k l i f t . S e v e r a l o t h e r e v e n t s 
- 1 -
o c c u r r e d w h i c h r e n d e r e d P e t t y Motor e l i g i b l e f o r i m m e d i a t e 
p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e f o r k l i f t a n d r e n d e r e d MESCO l i a b l e f o r 
c o n v e r s i o n . T h e s a l e o f t h e f o r k l i f t a l o n e was an a c t 
s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e c o n v e r s i o n . Demand and r e f u s a l 
w e r e n o t n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n v e r s i o n . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
M E S C O C O M M I T T E D C O N V E R S I O N BY 
INTENTIONALLY E X E R C I S I N G DOMINION AND 
C O N T R O L OVER THE F O R K L I F T WHICH 
SERIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THE RIGHTS OF 
PETTY MOTOR. 
A . C O N V E R S I O N OCCURRED UNDER FOUR SEPARATE AND 
D I S T I N C T CIRCUMSTANCES AND MESCO IS LIABLE FOR CONVERSION 
UNDER EACH. 
1 . MESCO C O M M I T T E D CONVERSION WHEN I T 
PURCHASED THE FORKLIFT FROM C.S .&G. MASONRY. 
When C . S . & G . Masonry c o n v e y e d t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO i n 
e x c h a n g e f o r c r e d i t and an a d d i t i o n a l f o r k l i f t , f o r a t o t a l 
v a l u e o f $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , t h e t r a n s f e r c o n s t i t u t e d a d e f a u l t of 
t h e L e a s e A g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n P e t t y Motor and C.S .&G. M a s o n r y , 
a n d e n t i t l e d P e t t y M o t o r t o i m m e d i a t e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e 
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f o r k l i f t . The L e a s e Agreemen t betweejn P e t t y Motor and 
C.S.&G. Masonry c l e a r l y des ignated the i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s 
t h a t t h e f o r k l i f t r e m a i n in t h e p o s s e s s i o n of C.S.&G. 
Masonry d u r i n g t h e term of the Lease. A copy of the Lease 
Agreement i s i n c l u d e d in the Addendum i s Exhibi t "A". In 
a d d i t i o n , paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Lease Agreement r equ i r e 
t h a t t h e f o r k l i f t be r e t u r n e d t o P e t t y Motor on t h e 
e x p i r a t i o n or t e rmina t ion of the Lease. The t r a n s f e r of the 
f o r k l i f t from C.S.&G. Masonry t o MESCO b r e a c h e d these 
p rov i s ions of the Lease Agreement. 
P a r a g r a p h s 2 , 3 , and 7 of the Lease Agreement, which 
s e t f o r t h t h e s tandards of maintenance, b a r e , and condi t ion 
of t h e f o r k l i f t , were a l s o breached v^hen C.S.&G. Masonry 
c o n v e y e d t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO, b e c a u s e the maintenance 
p r o v i s i o n s of t h e L e a s e were impossible to f u l f i l l . When 
MESCO r e c e i v e d t h e f o r k l i f t , t he re was no p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t 
C.S.&G. Masonry, the des ignated l e s see and custodian of the 
f o r k l i f t , could maintain the f o r k l i f t ii} any manner because 
i t h a d r e l i n q u i s h e d p o s s e s s i o n . C.S.&G. M a s o n r y ' s 
c o n v e y a n c e of t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO b r e a c h e d the Lease 
Agreement w i t h P e t t y M o t o r , c o n s t i t u t e d a d e f a u l t , and 
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entitled Petty Motor to immediate possession under Utah Code 
Ann. §79A-9-503. 
When interpreting a contract, the court must determine 
the intent of the parties and provide meaning and substance 
to the provisions of the agreement. In Mark Steel Corp. v. 
Eimco Corp., 548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976), the Court 
stated: 
The pr imary ru l e in i n t e r p r e t i n g a c o n t r a c t i s 
t o de t e rmine what the p a r t i e s intended by what they 
s a i d . We do no t add , ignore , or d i sca rd words in 
t h i s p r o c e s s ; b u t a t t e m p t t o render c e r t a i n the 
m e a n i n g of t h e p r o v i s i o n , i n d i s p u t e , by an 
o b j e c t i v e and reasonable cons t ruc t ion of the whole 
c o n t r a c t . 
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d to enforce the Lease Agreement, 
i t s i n t e n t , and t h e p rov i s ions for maintenance and r e t u r n . 
In d o i n g s o , i t i g n o r e d the i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s and the 
c o n t r a c t ' s p r o v i s i o n s . 
C.S.&G. M a s o n r y ' s s a l e and MESCO's purchase of the 
f o r k l i f t c o n s t i t u t e d a c o n v e r s i o n . "The mere a c t of 
p u r c h a s i n g t h e e n c u m b e r e d c o l l a t e r a l appears to have been 
enough t o s u s t a i n a c o n v e r s i o n a c t i o n , . . . " Wexler, 
R i g h t s a n d R e m e d i e s of t h e S e c u r e d P a r t y A f t e r an 
U n a u t h o r i z e d T r a n s f e r of C o l l a t e r a l : A P r o p o s a l f o r 
B a l a n c i n g C o m p e t i n g C l a i m s i n R e p o s s e s s i o n , R e s a l e , 
P r o c e e d s , and C o n v e r s i o n C a s e s , 32 Buf|. L. Rev. 373, 406 
( 1 9 8 3 ) . The r u l e s t a t i n g t h a t a sa][e c o n s t i t u t e s a 
conversion has been s t a t e d as fo l lows: 
"Any a c t of ownership or exe rc i s e of dominion 
o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y of a n o t h e r , in 4ef iance of h i s 
r i g h t s , i s a c o n v e r s i o n of t h a t p r o p e r t y . " And 
f u r t h e r : "And t h e g e n e r a l r u l e ils t h a t one who 
s e l l s t h e p r o p e r t y of a n o t h e r , even t h o u g h he 
b e l i e v e s he has t h e r i g h t to do sp , i s l i a b l e in 
t rove r to the t r u e owner" . . . . 
L u s i t a n i a n - American Development Company v. Seaboard Dairy 
C r e d i t C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 Cal . 2d 121, 34 P.^d 139, 143 (1934). 
See a l s o , C i t i c o r p H o m e o w n e r ' s , I n c . ^ v. Western Surety 
Co. ,_ 131 A r i z . 3 3 4 , 641 P.2d 248, 250 (1981) ( " I t i s well 
s e t t l e d t h a t a secured c r e d i t o r , upon de fau l t of the deb to r , 
has an i m m e d i a t e r i g h t to possess ion of the c o l l a t e r a l and 
can m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n f o r c o n v e r s i o n when t h e debtor 
t r a n s f e r s t h e s e c u r i t y " ) ; Cu lp v . S i g n a l Van & Storage , 
142 C a l . App. 2d 8 5 9 , 298 P.2d 162, 164 (1956) ("One who, 
t h o u g h h o n e s t l y and i n good f a i t h , p u r c h a s e s p e r s o n a l 
p r o p e r t y from one having no t i t l e t h e r e t o or r i g h t to s e l l 
the same is guilty of conversion."); Interstate 
Manufacturing Co. v. Interstate Products Co., 146 Mont. 
-5-
449 , 408 P. 2d 478, 481 (1965) ("There i s no ques t ion t h a t a 
s a l e of goods by an u n a u t h o r i z e d p a r t y c o n s t i t u t e s a 
c o n v e r s i o n . " ) ; Eade v . F i r s t Na t iona l Bank, 117 Ore. 80, 
242 P. 83 2 , 834 (1926) ("The ac t of the bank in s e l l i n g the 
m o r t g a g e d p r o p e r t y in d i s r ega rd of the P l a i n t i f f ' s super io r 
l i e n s c o n s t i t u t e d convers ion , and i t i s immaterial whether 
i n d o i n g so i t acted in good f a i t h . " ) ; S a t t e r f i e l d v. Sunny 
Day R e s o u r c e s , I n c . , 581 P . 2 d 1 3 8 6 , 1389 (Wyo. 1978) 
( " D e f e n d a n t ' s s a l e of t h e e q u i p m e n t in q u e s t i o n t h u s 
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e p h y s i c a l ac t of conversion and an exe rc i s e 
of d o m i n i o n o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y . " ) . In Keegan v. Lenzie , 
171 Ore. 194, 135 P.2d 717, 721 (1943), the cour t s t a t e d : 
" . . .A possess ion taken under a purchase from 
one w i t h o u t t i t l e , and who has himself been g u i l t y 
of a c o n v e r s i o n in d i s p o s i n g of t h e goods or 
c h a t t e l s , i s a possess ion unauthorized and wrongful 
a t i t s i n c e p t i o n , and which t h e absence of e v i l 
i n t e n t i n t h e p u r c h a s e r c a n n o t make r i g h t f u l or 
l a w f u l . S u c h a p o s s e s s i o n i s b a s e d on t h e 
a s s u m p t i o n of a r i g h t of p rope r ty , or a r i g h t of 
d o m i n i o n o v e r i t , d e r i v e d from t h e c o n t r a c t of 
s a l e ; and what i s t h i s in t h e l ega l sense but a 
w r o n g f u l i n t e rmedd l ing or a s p o r t a t i o n or de t en t ion 
of the proper ty of another? 
" . . .The c o n v e r s i o n may c o n s i s t simply of a 
p u r c h a s e , even by an innocen t p a r t y , of goods or 
o t h e r p e r s o n a l c h a t t e l s from one who has himself 
been g u i l t y of a convers ion in d ispos ing of them, 
where t h e b u y e r t a k e s t h e goods or c h a t t e l s i n to 
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h i s possession or custody. The au thdr i t i e s to th i s 
point are numerous and overwhelming. . . . " 
C.S.&G. Masonry c o n v e r t e d the fo rk l i f t upon sale to MESCO 
because i t nei ther received t i t l e to the fo rk l i f t under the 
Lease Agreement nor permission from Pett^ Motor to s e l l the 
f o r k l i f t , t h e s a l e b reached the Leaise Agreement and 
c o n s t i t u t e d a defaul t . MESCOf although i t claimed to be an 
i n n o c e n t p a r t y
 f was a l s o l i ab le for conversion because i t 
e x e r c i s e d c o n t r o l and dominion over| t he f o r k l i f t in 
c o n t r o v e n t i o n of Petty Motor's r i g h t s . MESCO's possession 
of the fork l i f t was therefore wrongful from i t s inception. 
MESCO a s s e r t s t h a t under Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-311 
( 1 9 5 3 ) , any s a l e or t r a n s f e r of the co l l a t e r a l which may 
c o n s t i t u t e a d e f a u l t w i l l have no e f f e c t . This section 
provides: 
The d e b t o r ' s r i g h t s in c o l l a t e r a l may be 
v o l u n t a r i l y or involuntari ly t ransferred (by way of 
s a l e , c r e a t i o n of a securi ty i n t e r e s t , attachment, 
l e v y , ga rn i shmen t or o t h e r j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s ) , 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a p r o v i s i o n irj t he s e c u r i t y 
agreement p r o h i b i t i n g any t ransfer or making the 
transfer cons t i tu te a defaul t . 
MESCO's p o s i t i o n , however, i s not j u s t i f i e d by 
p r e c e d e n t . In Production Credit Association of Madison v. 
- 7 -
Nowatzsk i , 90 Wis. 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1979), the 
court s ta ted : 
"Some peop le have sugges ted that 
s e c t i o n 9-311 prohibi ts you from using a 
t r a n s f e r of the co l l a t e r a l as a basis of 
a d e f a u l t . I t h i n k t h a t t h u s fa r 
n e i t h e r t h e s t a t u t e nor the c a s e s 
s u p p o r t t h a t conclusion. Section 9-311 
merely p r e s e r v e s the i n t e r e s t of the 
t r a n s f e r e e . If t he d e b t o r s e l l s the 
c a r , t he t r a n s f e r e e g e t s whatever the 
d e b t o r had. Yet, the sale can s t i l l be 
a d e f a u l t , and the buyer of that asset 
t a k e s s u b j e c t t o the secu red c la im 
c r e a t e d by the deb to r , and the buyer 's 
a b i l i t y t o keep the a s s e t s would be 
s u b j e c t t o the t h i r d p a r t y ' s r ight to 
repossess." 
"The d e f i n i t i o n of default i s not 
p r o v i d e d in the code . De fau l t i s a 
m a t t e r t o be defined by your agreement. 
[Footnote omi t t ed . ] . " 
Under S e e s . [9-311] and [9-306(2)], . . . the 
[ d e b t o r ] could indeed t r ans fe r the co l l a t e r a l to 
[ t h e t r ans f e r ee ] , but [the t ransferee] took subject 
to [ t h e secured pa r ty ' s ] securi ty i n t e r e s t . By the 
terms of the agreement between the [debtor] and 
[ t h e s e c u r e d p a r t y ] , t h e t r a n s f e r i t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e d a d e f a u l t which gave [ t h e secured 
p a r t y ] the r igh t to require that the co l l a t e r a l be 
surrendered. 
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In S t u r d e v a n t v. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of Deer Lodgef 
606 P. 2d 52 5 , 528 (Mont. 1980), the Montana Supreme Court 
s ta ted : 
I r r e s p e c t i v e of t h a t s e c t i o n [ 9 - 3 1 1 ] / a 
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t may d e c l a r e t h £ t the debtor 
commits a d e f a u l t when he makes a t ransfer of the 
c o l l a t e r a l because the c r e d i t o r has a r ight to 
d e t e r m i n e who shal l be the debtor ih a possession. 
Poydan, I n c . , v. Agai K i r i a k i , Incj:. , (1974), 130 
N . J . Super . 1 4 1 , 325 A.2d 838. gee a l so Layne 
v. F o r t Carson National Bank, 655 J>.2d 856 (Colo. 
App. 1982) ( " S e c t i o n 4-9-311 does not avoid a 
c o n t r a c t p r o v i s i o n making an uncontested t ransfer 
of the co l l a t e r a l at de fau l t ) " . 
S e c t i o n 70A-9-311 does not nul l i fy the provisions of 
t h e Lease Agreement which make the t ransfer of the fork l i f t 
a d e f a u l t . Under the terms of the Lease Agreement, Petty 
Motor can , and h a s , designated the partjy who was to be the 
d e b t o r in p o s s e s s i o n , and has designated that the transfer 
of the fork l i f t to anyone else const i tu te^ a defaul t . 
MESCO i s c l e a r l y l i a b l e to Petty Hotor for conversion 
based on the C.S.&G. Masonry ' s s a l e of t he fork l i f t to 
MESCO. The Restatement (Second) of Torts^ §22 9 s t a t e s : 
One who r e c e i v e s p o s s e s s i o n of a c h a t t e l from 
a n o t h e r with the in ten t to acquire for himself or 
for a t h i r d person a p ropr ie ta ry in te res t in the 
c h a t t e l which the o t h e r has not^  the power to 
t r a n s f e r i s subject to l i a b i l i t y for conversion to 
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a t h i r d p e r s o n t h e n e n t i t l e d t o i m m e d i a t e 
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e c h a t t e l . 
C . S . & G . M a s o n r y b r e a c h e d t h e t e r m s of t h e L e a s e 
A g r e e m e n t by s e l l i n g t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO. MESCO c o n v e r t e d 
t h e f o r k l i f t by w r o n g f u l l y t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n of i t and 
e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l and dominion over i t in c o n t r o v e n t i o n of 
t h e r i g h t s of P e t t y Motor . Because t h e Lease Agreement was 
b r e a c h e d and i n d e f a u l t , P e t t y M o t o r was e n t i t l e d t o 
i m m e d i a t e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e f o r k l i f t . MESCO's b e l i e f t h a t 
i t o b t a i n e d an o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t in t h e f o r k l i f t , and i t s 
a c t s of dominion and c o n t r o l over t h e f o r k l i f t , c o n s t i t u t e a 
c o n v e r s i o n fo r which MESCO i s l i a b l e . 
2 . MESCO CONVERTED THE FORKLIFT BY 
UTILIZING IT IN ITS RENTAL FLEET. 
MESCO a d m i t s u s i n g t h e f o r k l i f t fo r i t s own b e n e f i t by 
p l a c i n g i t in i t s r e n t a l f l e e t . ( D e p o s i t i o n of Del Lewis P. 
2 9 ) . T h i s u s e and i n t e r f e r e n c e of dominion and c o n t r o l over 
t h e f o r k l i f t c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n v e r s i o n under R e s t a t e m e n t 
(Second) of T o r t s §227 , which s t a t e s : 
C o n v e r s i o n by u s i n g c h a t t e l . One who u s e s a 
c h a t t e l in a manner which i s a s e r i o u s v i o l a t i o n of 
t h e r i g h t of a n o t h e r t o c o n t r o l i t s u se i s s u b j e c t 
t o l i a b i l i t y t o t h e o t h e r fo r c o n v e r s i o n . 
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MESCO's use of the f o r k l i f t in i t s r e n t a l f l e e t 
t h e r e f o r e , c o n s t i t u t e d a conversion, and is ref lec t ive of 
MESCO's a d m i t t e d i n t e n t to own the fork l i f t and use i t or 
s e l l i t as i t s own. 
3 . C . S . & G. MASONRY DEFAULTED iu MAKING 
PAYMENTS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LEASE IN 
JANUARY, 1981 . 
On J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 8 1 , P e t t y M o t o r r e c e i v e d t h e l a s t 
p a y m e n t f r o m C . S . & G . M a s o n r y on t h e f o r k l i f t . (See t h e 
p a y m e n t r e c o r d , a copy of which i s i n c l u d e d in t h e Addendum 
a s E x h i b i t " B " ) . The f a c t t h a t no p a y m e n t s w e r e made 
t h e r e a f t e r , c o n s t i t u t e d a d e f a u l t under t h e L e a s e , e n t i t l e d 
P e t t y M o t o r t o i m m e d i a t e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e f o r k l i f t , and 
c o n s t i t u t e d a c o n v e r s i o n b e c a u s e MESpO was a s s e r t i n g an 
o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t in t h e f o r k l i f t t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of P e t t y 
M o t o r ' s dominion and c o n t r o l . 
4. ME SCO CONVERTED THE FORKLIFl? WHEN IT 
SOLD THE FORKLIFT TO REDBALL WELDING. 
On or about May 5, 1981, MESCO conveyed the forklift to 
Redball Welding of Ogden, Utah, for $21,000.00. (See the 
Retail Installment Contract, a copy of v^ hich is included in 
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t h e A d d e n d u m a s E x h i b i t " C " . ( R . 8 1 , D e p o s i t i o n of De l 
L e w i s P . 2 9 ) . T h i s s a l e c o n s t i t u t e s y e t a n o t h e r c o n v e r s i o n 
b e c a u s e i t s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h P e t t y M o t o r ' s r i g h t 
o f d o m i n i o n and c o n t r o l o v e r t h e f o r k l i f t . The s a l e of t h e 
f o r k l i f t b y MESCO t o R e d b a l l W e l d i n g c o n s t i t u t e d a 
c o n v e r s i o n f o r w h i c h MESCO i s l i a b l e . 
B . DEMAND AND REFUSAL I S NOT A CONDITIONED PRECEDENT 
TO RECOVERY FOR CONVERSION. 
MESCO p r o p o s e s t h a t i n o r d e r f o r a c o n v e r s i o n t o be 
e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t a d e m a n d m u s t be made f o r t h e r e t u r n of 
t h e p r o p e r t y a n d t h e D e f e n d a n t mus t r e f u s e t o r e t u r n t h e 
p r o p e r t y . As s u p p o r t f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n , MESCO c i t e s 
C l a r k J e w e l e r s v . S a t t e r t h w a i t , 8 Kan . App. 2d 5 6 9 , 66 2 
P . 2d 1 3 0 1 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . T h i s c a s e , h o w e v e r , i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 
f r o m t h e c a s e a t b a r b e c a u s e D e f e n d a n t G a r b e r a c c o m p a n i e d 
D e f e n d a n t S a t t e r t h w a i t h t o t h e j e w e l r y s t o r e , t h e r i n g s w e r e 
f i t t e d t o G a r b e r b y j e w e l r y s t o r e s ' e m p l o y e e s , and i t was 
k n o w n a n d c o n c e d e d b y t h e j e w e l r y s t o r e t h a t G a r b e r w o u l d 
t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e r i n g s and t h a t t h e y w e r e i n t e n d e d f o r 
h e r . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , C .S .&G. Masonry s o l d and c o n v e y e d 
t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO w i t h n o k n o w l e d g e o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n 
- 1 2 -
from P e t t y M o t o r , MESCO u t i l i z e d the f o r k l i f t for i t s own 
b e n e f i t and t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of P e t t y Moto r , and MESCO 
r e s o l d t h e f o r k l i f t t o Redball Welding. Pe t ty Motor had no 
k n o w l e d g e and i n no way c o n s e n t e d to the t r a n s f e r of the 
f o r k l i f t from C.S.&G. Masonry. 
Demand i s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a conversion when a 
p a r t y r i g h t f u l l y comes i n t o possess ion of the c o l l a t e r a l , 
u n l e s s a c o n v e r s i o n has o c c u r r e d independent of demand. 
This r u l e has been s t a t e d as fo l lows: 
The p u r p o s e of p r o v i n g a demand for proper ty 
by a p l a i n t i f f and a r e fusa l by defendant to r e tu rn 
i t in an a c t i o n f o r c o n v e r s i o n i s t o show the 
c o n v e r s i o n . The g e n e r a l l y accepted ru l e i s t h a t 
demand and r e f u s a l a r e unnecessary where the ac t 
compla ined of amounts to a conversion r e g a r d l e s s of 
whether a demand i s made. 
G o o d r i c h v . Malowney, 157 So. 2d 829 (F lor ida 1963). See 
a l s o , McCrae v . Bandy , 270 A l a . 1 2 , 115 So. 2d 479, 483 
( 1 9 5 9 ) ( " t h e wrongfu l assumption or dominion over proper ty 
of a n o t h e r i n s u b v e r s i o n and d e n i a l of h i s r i g h t s , 
c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n v e r s i o n of such proper ty i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
w h e t h e r t h e r e i s a demand made f o r t h e s u r r e n d e r and a 
r e f u s a l t o s u r r e n d e r s a i d p rope r ty . " ) t McDaniel v. White, 
140 Ga. App. 1 1 8 , 230 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1976) ("In a t rove r 
- 1 3 -
a c t i o n , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t the p l a i n t i f f prove e i t h e r a 
c o n v e r s i o n or a demand f o r h i s goods and r e f u s a l t o 
r e t u r n . " ) ; Mul in v . J . J . Q u i l a n & C o , , 195 N.Y. 109, 87 
N.E . 1 0 7 8 , 1080 ( 1 9 0 9 ) (" . . . t h e r e having been an a c t u a l 
c o n v e r s i o n , a demand upon the defendant was unnecessary to 
r e n d e r i t l i a b l e . This ru l e i s well s e t t l e d . " ) ; Gaylord v. 
H o a r , 122 V t . 1 4 3 , 165 A.2d 358, 362 (1960) ( " there i s no 
n e c e s s i t y of proof of a demand or r e fusa l for the purpose of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a convers ion , when the conversion i s o therwise 
e s t a b l i s h e d , as i t i s h e r e by the s a l e of the car by the 
d e f e n d a n t . " ) ; C i t y L o a n C o m p a n y v . S t a t e C r e d i t 
A s s o c i a t i o n , 5 Wash. App. 560, 490 P.2d 118, 120 (1971) ("A 
demand and r e f u s a l i s m e r e l y e v i d e n t i a l and need not be 
shown t o make o u t a c a s e of c o n v e r s i o n where some other 
i n d e p e n d e n t a c t of c o n v e r s i o n i s i n e v i d e n c e . " ) ; 
S a t t e r f i e l d v . Sunny Day R e s o u r c e s , I n c . , 581 P.2d 1386, 
13 8 9 (Wyo. 1978) ( " . . . Where Defendant did not have the 
p o s s e s s i o n of the converted equipment, a demand and r e fusa l 
were no t r e q u i r e d , the need t he r e fo re being obviated by an 
i n d e p e n d e n t s p e c i f i c a c t of c o n v e r s i o n , i . e . , t h e 
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e q u i p m e n t - 1 * s a l . - ^ o r v . _ Wagner, _ 2. W. 2d 7 9 4
 r 
7b y ; r e x . ^ * *&-* " - 4 - * !>~ -'ourt s t a t e d : 
! fiH - j e n e r a i r u i - : • : ha t one who has come i n t o 
tn>: p o s s e s s i o n of p r o p e r t y l a w f u l l y c a n n o t be h e l d 
l i a b l e f o r a c o n v e r s i o n in t h e a b s e n c e of demand 
and r e f u s a l t o d e l i v e r , . . . Such r u l e , h o w e v e r , 
i s n o t w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n . A b a i l e e who a s s e r t s 
t i t l e h o s t i l e t o h i s b a i l o r , a n d w r o n g f u l l y 
a p p r o p r i a t e s t h e p r o p e r t y t o h i s own u s e a n d 
b e n e f i t , i s g u i l t y o f a n i n d e p e n d e n t a c t o f 
c o n v e r s i o n w h i c h r e n d e r s h i m l i a b l e w i t h o u t 
p r e v i o u s d e m a n d by h i s b a i l o r a n d r e f u s a l t o 
d e l i v e r . Demand and r e f u s a l o r d i n a r i l y i s m e r e l y 
e v i d e n c e o f c o n v e r s i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g a prima f a c i e 
c a s e . 
I n a d . . * - - c e s s i t y f o r d e m a n d and 
r e f u s a l v h e r e -. u M , 1 - u s e l e s s t c in d k..- • . 1 • - r -^  .* 
J3 a ;lli_f LU 1 i r s t N a t i o n a l B a n k o f M i s s o u l a , 1 : i 
Mor. \ , < 3 ; ') f> " r / - - -• • . s J w h e r e t h e i n i t i a 1 t a k i ly 
w 1 - A- r o n q f J . ? r w h e r e t h e r e i s an i n d e p e n d e i . u ^ L zf 
^ w i . ^ c r ^ ^ . i : : , • . - • a s s e r t i o n o f t i t l e o r e x e r c i s e o f 
d o m i n i o n i n c o n s i s t e n t w i i i . L ri_£ . . q r. *_ s _ oi_ j_ :itr r l a i n t i f f , o r 
w h e r e i L : :? : l e a r t h a t o demand would rvj >./r- been u s e i --- - : 
i 1 i 1 n u -I e T\ a n • < . - n i. r n e c e s s a r y . , In 
C r u t c h e r v . S C U L L r a o ^ i ^ . n c * . . - , «*2 Wash. 2d 8 9 , i ~ j r , 2d 
'^ 2 5 , 9 3 2 - 3 3 ( 1 9 5 3 ) trie c o u r t s e a t e d : 
* :• n .•'!)• e v e i . L , o ..iemand was u n n e c e s s a r y e i t h e r f o r 
t h e p r o p e r t y or 1 or damages as f o r i t s c o n v e r s i o n , 
_ j 5... 
i n v i ew of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m of o w n e r s h i p 
t h e r e o f . T h e D e f e n d a n t ' s a t t i t u d e in t h i s 
c o n t r o v e r s y from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g abso lu t e ly 
n e g a t i v e s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a demand. I t i s 
c o n c l u s i v e l y shown t h a t a demand would have been 
u n a v a i l i n g in v iew of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s claim of 
o w n e r s h i p of t h e p r o p e r t y in h i s defense of t h i s 
ac t ion upon the m e r i t s . 
MESCO f s a t t i t u d e d u r i n g t h e pendency of t h i s ac t ion 
makes demand u n n e c e s s a r y . MESCO had a l ready conveyed the 
f o r k l i f t t o R e d b a l l W e l d i n g , t h e u l t i m a t e express ion of 
o w n e r s h i p , and t h e r e was no reason to be l i eve t h a t MESCO 
c o u l d r e g a i n p o s s e s s i o n of the f o r k l i f t for i t s r e tu rn to 
Pe t ty Motor or t h a t demand would have been f r u i t f u l . 
Demand and r e f u s a l a r e a l s o n o t n e c e s s a r y when the 
D e f e n d a n t t a k e s possess ion of the proper ty t o r t i o u s l y . "As 
t o demand and r e fu sa l to e s t a b l i s h convers ion , no demand i s 
r e q u i r e d i f t h e t a k i n g , as in t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , i s 
t o r t i o u s . " Ko lodney v . K o l o d n e y B r o s . , I n c . , 21 Conn. 
Sup . 3 1 2 , 154 A. 2d 540, 543 (1959). This d o c t r i n e has been 
d iscussed and se t fo r th as fo l lows: 
P l a i n t i f f has a l s o e a r n e s t l y p r e s s e d t h e 
a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e t o r t of conversion i s a c t u a l l y 
no t committed u n t i l t he re has been a demand for the 
d e l i v e r y of the proper ty and a r e fusa l to surrender 
i t . I n some i n s t a n c e s , as for example, when a man 
l e n d s a c h a t t e l t o a n o t h e r , i t would be wholly 
u n c o n s c i o n a b l e t o p e r m i t t h e b a i l o r to sue and 
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• recover judgment and costs of conversion against 
the ba i l ee until the court could be convinced that 
there had been an ac tua l e f fo r t to withhold the 
p r o p e r t y . Therefore , in such a case , i n the 
absence of a demand and refusal, the court could 
not give the Plaintiff judgment in trover. On the 
other hand, if a person should consume, s e l l , 
d e s t r c \ , otherwise dispose of the a r t i c l e 
loaned, there would be no purpose in demanding i ts 
r e t u r n . The law genera l ly never requires that a 
person go through the motions of doing what would 
be f u t i l e or demanding that another do what he has 
put i t out of his power to perform. To us the 
purpose of the "demand and refusal" rule, in those 
cases where i t applies, is simply to set t le whether 
there has been a conversion or not. If from other 
circumstances it; is c lear that the tort has been 
committed, the quest ion needs no such further 
s e t t l emen t , and the court moves on to whatever 
o t h e r quest ions are i 1:1 t h e case, 1 s a o I ] y the 
assessment of damages. 
Mastellone v, Argo Oil Corp. , 1 £ n ^ 1 •. , 
w - M 1 ] Q|f:'» 1 1 , 
Demand i « also un^ct.sa.5, • ' ' it* .. occurs as a 
result of frauc le Supreme Cour* •-* Oregon : stac-<:: 
; , !. • . js ccises cited i_: t *-:- Annotations 95 
A. ^ • - . r Uustrate, when possession of goods is 
obtained by fraud, a conversion has taken place and 
the p l a i n t i f f is entitled to maintain an action of 
t rover without previous demand. This is because 
there has been an original tortious taking by the 
defendant as opposed to the case of an original 
lawful possession in the defendant.. 
Gowen v . H e i d e r , 237 Ore. 266, 386 P.2d 1, 19 (1963). The 
f r a u d o c c u r r e d in t h i s case when C.S.&G. Masonry conveyed 
t h e f o r k l i f t t o MESCO w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t the 
o u t s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to Pe t ty Motor had been paid in f u l l . 
(R. 7 6 ) . As a r e s u l t of t h i s fraud, no demand or r e fusa l i s 
n e c e s s a r y , and conve r s ion occurred when MESCO received the 
f o r k l i f t . 
Wyman v . C a r r a b a s s e t t Harwood Lumber C o . , 121 Me. 
2 7 1 , 116 A. 729 ( 1 9 2 2 ) , i s ana logous to the case a t bar . 
The P l a i n t i f f owned fa rms and personal p roper ty which he 
w i s h e d t o s e l l . Buyer p u r c h a s e d one farm and personal 
p r o p e r t y t h e r e o n , and P l a i n t i f f executed a Deed and B i l l of 
S a l e which he l e f t with a bank for d e l i v e r y upon r e c e i p t of 
t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e . The buyer, unknown to P l a i n t i f f , sold 
t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y to the Defendant, and Defendant then 
d e f a u l t e d in i t s payments and P l a i n t i f f brought a c t i o n . The 
i s s u e in t h e c a s e was w h e t h e r the tak ing of the personal 
proper ty by the Defendant was t o r t i o u s . The cour t reasoned: 
The vendee , . . . , was to rece ive t i t l e to the 
r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y upon payment to the 
P l a i n t i f f of t h e p r i c e a g r e e d u p o n . I t c o u l d 
convey no t i t l e u n t i l t h e p r i c e was pa id . Hence 
i t s n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e [ d e f e n d a n t ] were 
u n a u t h o r i z e d , n u l l , and void , and made the de l i ve ry 
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o f t h e [ p e r s o n a l ] p r o p e r t y by i t t o r and t h e 
r e c e p t i o n o f i t b y , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o m p a n y a 
t o r t i o u s t a k i n g and p o s s e s s i o n . 
I d . a t 7 3 s• v ^ r * . ie "i er -. 1 
r u l e s c o n c e r n ; ;g * . ; - r s i G i . / j u s t i : y l i b ..-: , -
p o s s e s s i o n o: r:v- r - r , * -^^ ' >,r o^ r tv wa * j r t i o u s : 
" T h u s i . - .^ -_-w ., . . . . A 1 
a n a r e f u s a l p r ; J I t o t r ie br r, ji*)g the 
a c t i oil , ,i Lrover , need not be shown when 
an i n n o c e n t p u r c h a s e r of goods from one 
who had no t i t l e had s o l d t h e same, or 
h a s e x e r c i s e d o w n e r s h i p by l e t t i n g t h e 
p r o p e r t y , o r when i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y of one 
who had no r i g h t t o sc11. 3.nd ho lds i t 
t o hi s own use . ,f 
" T n e s a l e be ing c o n d i t i o n a l , . - t h a t 
no * ; r. "* e s h a l l pass u n t i l t h e vendee pay 
t h e p r i c e of t h e a r t i c l e s s o l d and 
d e l i v e r e d , t h e v e n d o r , i f g u i l t y of no 
l a c h e s , may r e c l a i m t h e p r o p e r t y , even 
f r o m a vendee in good f a i t h , and w i t h o u t 
n o t i c e . . . . The c h a t t e l in such c a s e 
i s i n the c o n s t r u c t i v e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e 
s e l l e r , and an a c t i o n may be m a i n t a i n e d 
w i t h o u t a demand in c a s e of a c o n v e r s i o n 
by t h e p u r c h a s e r , " 
" W h o e v e r t a k e s t h e p r o p e r t y of 
a n o t h e r w i t h o u t h i s c o n s e n t , e x p r e s s or 
i m p l i e d , o r w i t h o u t t h e a s s e n t of 
s o m e o n e a u t h o r i z e d t o a c t in h i s b e h a l f , 
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t a k e s i t , i n t h e e y e of t he law, 
t o r t i ous ly . " 
" I t i s e s t a b l i s h e d as elementary 
law by wel l s e t t l e d p r i n c i p a l s , and a 
l o n g l i n e of d e c i s i o n s , t h a t any 
d i s t i n c t ac t of dominion over property 
in d e n i a l of the o w n e r ' s r i gh t , or in 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t , amounts t o a 
conversion•" 
The use made of the p l a i n t i f f ' s p e r s o n a l 
p r o p e r t y by the defendant was inconsistent with the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t s , and was therefore a conversion. 
The foregoing rules of law must be regarded as 
d e c i s i v e of the t o r t i o u s taking and possession of 
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y by the de fendan t as 
p u r c h a s e r . The t a k i n g of p o s s e s s i o n under the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the present case being t o r t i o u s , 
i t f o l l ows tha t the conversion was coincident with 
t he t a k i n g , and e s t a b l i s h e s that the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
r i g h t of a c t i o n as a c c r u e d a t t h a t t i m e . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , no demand was n e c e s s a r y as a 
condition precedent to his r ight if act ion. 
I d . As was the case in Wyman, C.S.&G. Masonry never 
r e c e i v e d any t i t l e to the f o r k l i f t under the Lease 
Agreement . P e t t y Motor gave no express or implied consent 
t h a t t he f o r k l i f t could be conveyed to MESCO. C.S.&G. 
Masonry ' s s a l e of the fork l i f t to MESCO was a d i s t i n c t act 
of dominion over the f o r k l i f t which was inconsistent with 
and den ied P e t t y Motor's r ights in the f o r k l i f t . In l ight 
- 2 0 -
O' : I t h e sal<-' f *" r ' rK i f ? ("" f;-,r i t .nt .ed ; 
c o n v e r s e ; ; . .*1 J h ^ r a u . s - ^ : 
c o n v e r s i o r . , t h e t a k i n g * . - r : -jiiS d? < : • demana ., r - i j s o . 
w - i s -- *^ <- - , • -- . 
o t • v • . ' * - * : ' ' ^ c a d S ' r :-ett*v 4 . - J - w / i i : , : ..-r 
i r i dve b e e n a s e l e s - B e c a u s e MESCn's r e c e i p t 
of .. - : \ . . was t o r t i o u s , . . - . „ . 
t h e f o r < i i r r *
 3 , r ^ s u J t of f r a u d , demand ana rei. US--K i r e 
- *-* -- - -<.,.-.,• -. ")f " o n v e r s i o r , 
C. EQUITY :.<, L . . .. • „ - ••'»,-. 
FOR CONVERSION. 
MESCv-*^ ^r4" ^f accepting t:i^ f. . M J i . . . . ..3 
i t s A -nachi.ie , and s e L , 1 n g -: n e t" o r k 1 i f. t t -. :< - •: c a . L 
suen a serious interference with the 
i-;i \> i -: -lEb^O's acts constitute a 0. /-. . MhS 3 
s^ -4 7 r,i r icant 1 y interfered inn disrupted the security owned 
* " i - - a \i : t y d -• .r. a n d s a r e c o v e r / .^q a 1 n s t 
M E S C O , « : \ **: . - . • • * ' :• \ i Con- :,- 5 
s t r u c t u r e d t o g ive the s e l l e r / s e c u r e d p a r t y a dependable and 
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v i a b l e s e c u r i t y in c h a t t e l s . When a lessee disposes of 
s e c u r e d c o l l a t e r a l , without the consent or knowledge of the 
s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r , the goals of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n t o the secured par ty , safety to the 
c o l l a t e r a l , and n o t i c e t o the world of t he outstanding 
i n t e r e s t , a r e circumvented. When secured property becomes 
l o s t " in a sea of s t r a n g e r s " , W. P r o s s e r , Law of Torts 
§15 (5 th Ed. 1984) , t he goods may be forever los t or, as 
h e r e , r e q u i r e two y e a r s of s e a r c h i n g before they can be 
l o c a t e d . In a d d i t i o n , the secured credi tor has no control 
over t he c o n d i t i o n or main tenance of t he c o l l a t e r a l or 
w h e t h e r he w i l l be ab l e t o when the d e b t o r s e l l s the 
c o l l a t e r a l , t he secured party will almost cer ta in ly suffer 
undue and c o s t l y d e l a y s , i n c o n v e n i e n c e , and expense to 
l o c a t i n g and r e p o s s e s s i n g the c o l l a t e r a l . For t h e s e 
r e a s o n s , where the agreement between the pa r t i e s expressly 
and i m p l i e d l y r e q u i r e s the c o l l a t e r a l to remain with the 
l e s s e e , s e t t i n g the s ecu red property "afloat in a sea of 
s t r a n g e r s " , ijd, c o n s t i t u t e s a breach of the agreement and 
r e n d e r s the secured party e l ig ib le for immediate possession. 
Because c o n v e r s i o n i s regarded as a t o r t of degree, there 
- 2 2 -
c a n b e no m o r e s i g n ! i i c a n t i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h I. hi- o w n e r s ' 
i n t e r e s t s t h a n t o c o n v e y t h e s e c u r e d p r o p e r t y t o unknown 
i nd i. v i d u d, I s „ "T" h 11 n a u f hi o i. i z e d s a I e o f t h e c o 1 I a t e r a 1 
const i tut es a conversion and renders the. f urchaser thereof 
liable. 
r
 'I-* ' : ' - a e ' s niecrictnism : o r o t ^ c t i n ^ 
* ;-= i n n ;-**. t p i , i o n d s e ? - . ie r e c o r d i n g / 
, ' i t . e r e s t * ',* - - ^ o r e t c r •-.>: S t a t e ' s o f f i c e . ?ezL\ Motor 
-*,A •: - "i n * , , . d L£ d L I on - M*'^
 w . . the 
S e c r e t a r y or S t a t e which ^ a v r ,ujr. ..e t o *"h<=> w< -*-*,- s 
o u t s t a n d i n g * i n t e r e s t in t n e f o r k l i f t . ivESCO f a i l e d t o a v a i l 
i t s e l f of . ,. .-- , :•->* ' ; ; u n e whether t n e • ' " . r ^ P L 
A-ds e n c j m b e r e d ci «H-TG c.y • ' . -,• . * " M a s o n r y ,
 :-* M , r 
s h o u l d nc -. be oe na I J Z ed f o r MESCO * s : a l 1 u r e t o ir.ee t : : s du* v 
f n s ^ a r r 1 - - - M ' : ; ' j f S t 3 ^ ' - • t f i c e . 
F i r s t N a t i o n a l B a n k o f H i g h l a n d v . M e r c h a n t ^ ^ L ^ ^ 1 
*
 l: s u r a :
"
J c e
 - — , ~ * - ^ * -"-• I r 
1 r ^ " r ; ^ : - ? n d a r - . • • • . n i s i e s u r */; . i i " ;pos^ a 
i u t y u p o n a n i n s u r e r t o s e a r c r: t h e r e c o i . 
s e t t 1 erne n t , -. * w e v e r , - - ^ :; t r a r v r a i i n g wo u , c - e n u ^ i 
n . -; . • •
 s the t i l i n g requirements of 
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A r t i c l e 9 v a l u e l e s s . The f u n c t i o n of t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s i s 
t o p u t t h i r d p a r t i e s on n o t i c e of t h e s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r ' s 
c l a i m . " ) . T h i s b r e a c h of MESCO's du ty p u t s i t a t r i s k fo r 
t h e c o n v e r s i o n w h i c h o c c u r r e d . To r e l i e v e MESCO of i t s 
l i a b i l i t y f o r c o n v e r s i o n w o u l d n u l l i f y t h e d u t y of 
p u r c h a s e r s of c o l l a t e r a l t o p r u d e n t l y s e a r c h t h e r e c o r d s for 
e n c u m b e r a n c e s , w o u l d s e v e r e l y h a n d i c a p t h e p r o t e c t i o n 
a f f o r d e d s e c u r e d c r e d i t o r s , and would u n d e r c u t t h e e n t i r e 
s t r u c t u r e of t h e Uniform Commercial Code in Utah . 
CONCLUSION 
MESCO c o n v e r t e d t h e f o r k l i f t upon r e c e i p t from C.S.&G. 
M a s o n r y . C . S . & G . M a s o n r y had no t i t l e o r a u t h o r i t y t o 
c o n v e y t h e s e c u r e d c o l l a t e r a l and w r o n g f u l l y consummated t h e 
t r a n s a c t i o n . S a l e of t h e f o r k l i f t a l o n e c o n s t i t u t e s a 
c o n v e r s i o n . The U C C , U t a h Code Ann. §70A-9 -311 , does not 
i n v a l i d a t e t h e d e f a u l t which r e s u l t e d from t h e conveyance . 
MESCO's u s e of t h e f o r k l i f t i n i t s r e n t a l f l e e t , C.S.&G. 
M a s o n r y ' s d e f a u l t in t h e paymen t s , and MESCO's conveyance of 
t h e f o r k l i f t t o R e d b a l l Welding each c o n s t i t u t e a s e p a r a t e 
c o n v e r s i o n . No demand was n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e t h e t a k i n g was 
w r o n g f u l , t o r t i o u s , f r a u d u l e n t , and demand would have been 
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u s e . v .-
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Petty Motor Lease, Int 
601 SOUTH MAIN 
SALT LAX2 CITY, UTAH / 84111 
PHONE 363-2643 
Tbia
 !rifflC22tXl£Xlt madc and entcrcd lnt0 tws21sJL_<*»r <* F e b r u a r y
 1978 b7 ana between PETTY 
MOTOR LEASE, INC.. ft corporation, hereinafter called Owner, and ^ l v l c l b O n r y ^ 
5487 Arches Dr. , Kearns, Utah 84118 
herein called Uaer, WTTNESaETH: 
That Owner hereby leases to User and User hires from Owner, for use "only within the Continental limits of the United States, tti0 following de-
scribed property, to-wit: 
1978 Swinger Forkliftmodel 300, Ser. No. 300637 
for a term of O ^ months commencing on the ^ i S t day of -T QU. , 19 7 o , and ending on the 2 0 t h day of F 6 D , 
19 Q ^ which lease shall be strictly under the following terms and conditions: 
i. User agrees to pay to Owner as rental for the use of said property the sum of S 7 3 5 . 8 3 » p l u s 5 % u s e t a * PW month, payable in 
advance at the office of Owner in Salt Lake City, Utah. 7f any rental payment is not paid within 10 aays after uie due date thereof, this lease shall 
automatically expire. Said monthly payment will permit User a maximum mileage of 20,000 miles per year. 
Additional mileage will be charged for at the rate of "" per mile. 
2. User agrees to deposit with Owner the sum of S -* * 
ooo. OQK 
e held by Owner, without interest, until ^li-terms of this lease hove been 
faithfully performed and the property returned to Owner in a satisfactory condition, whereupon said .deposit shall be returned to User. However, if 
User violatea any condition of this agreement Owner may retain such portion of said deposit as may be necessary to compensate Owner for the loss 
or damage caused by such violation, and should the sum deposited be insufficient to compensate Owner for the loss or damage caused by such vio-
lation, User agrees to pay the deficiency to Owner. 
3. User agrees to continually maintain said property in good condition and repair and that whenever possible the maintenance of said property 
shall be performed at Owner's designated shop, at User's expense, except that if User operates a repair shop, work may be performed at such shop, 
but repair or replacement parts required for such maintenance shall be purchased from Owner's designated agency at prices prevailing at that time 
for such parts. 
4. In addition to the payments hereinabove provided. User agrees to pay Owner an amount equal to the sum of ail registration fees, licenae fees , 
property taxes or other fees and taxes, and any other charges levied against said property or its use during the term of this lease, it being under-
stood that such sum as is paid by User to Owner under this paragraph shall be paid by Owner as such charges are levied or assessed , and should 
additional amounts be levied or assessed against said property or its use, User agrees to pay the same to Owner upon demand. User also agrees to 
pay or discharge the cost of traffic citations or parking tickets assessed against User or the property during the term of this lease . 
5. ( ^ ^ t g r •) agreea to maintain during the term of this tease not less than$25,000pronj»rty damage inaurance and $100,000/5300,000 pub-
lic liability insurance, which Insurance shall provide protection for Owner and User. The ( Tj S fi T ) agreea to maintain during the term of this 
lease , fire, theft, comprehensive and $100 deductible collision insurance on the above described property, which insurance shall provide protection 
for Owner and User as their interests may appear. In case of damage User agrees to pay the first $100 of the cost of replacement or repairs and all 
damage not covered by such Insurance. Owner may have in effect at the commencement of this lease fire, theft, comprehensive snd $100 deductible 
collision insurance. If User furnishes Owner with evidence of satisfactory Insurance coverag e within fifteen days from the commencement of the 
lease, Owner's insurance policy shall be terminated with no expense to User. However, if evidence of satisfactory insurance coverage has not been 
furnished by User within fifteen days of the commencement of this lease. User shall pay to Owner the total premium under such insurance policy of 
Owner and that policy may be kept in full force and effect during the term of this iease. In addition. User specifically agrees to defend and hold 
harmless Owner from any claim or liability whatsoever arising from the use of the property herein leased during the terra of"this lease , including 
Owner's Negligence. Should User now or in the future become an "assigned risk" or should s higher than sverage insurance premium otherwise be 
required, snd if Owner has herein agreed to maintain inaurance coverage, user agrees to pay any additional premium upon demand. 
6. This Lease may be terminated by User at any time during the period of the Lease, or, it User violates any ot tne terms ot tnis agreement. 
Owner may, without notice, terminate this Lease. If this Lease is terminated by either Owner or User for any reaaon or expires aa provided in para-
graph 1, hereof. User agrees to pay to Owner any and ail past due payments or other sums then due under the terms of this Lease, including, but not 
limited to, the cost of repairs required to bring the property to good condition plus the final lease payment in full, and. In addition thereto, to pay 
45 per cent of the monthly rental multiplied by the number of months the lease has yet to run, which sum is to compensate Owner for the greater 
costs and depreciation occuring during the first part of the Lease aa compared to the last part of the Lease. 
7. Upon expiration or termination of this agreement User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good mechanical condition and repair, with tirea 
having at leaat SO per cent of original tread and free from body damage, scratched or chipped paint or torn or frayed uphoistry . Any expense by 
Owner to bring unit to the above described condition shall be paid for by User. 
3. If User fails to make payments when due, or if User fails to perform any other condition of this lease. Owner may «nter the premises upon 
which the property unit is kept, without notice or demand, and remove the same with or without process of law and User hereby waives any action for 
trespass or damage resulting from such entry or removal. User agrees to pay ail costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred 
by Owner in enforcement of its rights under this agreement and agrees to pay interest at the highest rate allowed by law upon ail amounts not paid 
wh "i due. 
9. User accepts the property in its present condition and acknowledges that there are no warrantees express or implied as to the condition, 
sir ib i l i ty^uai i ty or performance of the property. 
EXECUTED the day a-.id year first above written. 
PETTY MOT05^££ASE, INC. 
By 
GUARANTY 
In consideration of the execution of the above Lease by Motor Lease, Inc., we. the undersigned, Jointly and severally guarantee payments of all 
amounts due or to become due under the above Lease and guarantee performance of ail the terms thereof and consent to any extension of time for 
payments ox performance. 
EXECUTED this day of. » . 196 
This lease will pay out in full if 
payments a re made as called for over
 m 
60 months, and property will become 
C S . & G. Masonry 's . " . f A / S 8 I, ^ 3 IT 1 ^ /A *J 
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NTAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT JA 
1 Buyer (Last Name First) and oddressL?j| 
sfrte^ /tiffin/ 
County Z p Code 
2 Seller and address 
7
 Zsasdr 
'££. * h/ 
Borg Warn«r Acceptance Corporation 
Subsidiary o< Boiq Wa oe Cc CH at -> 
Bf vir hereby orders and agrees to buy the products described below and Seller agrees to sell sub|ect to Seller s ability to obtain 
the products from the manufacturer in time for delivery and prior to any price change by manufacturer 
DESCRIPTION UNCLUDE ATTACHMENTS) SEL ING PRICE 
£ . ? 7 INCLUDING SALES IAX 
1(a) TOTAL AjUjXJLlL 











TRADE IN VALUE 
LESS O W I N G TO 
NET TRADE IN A U G V A N f E 
CASH DOV N PAYMENT ORDER $ _ 
TOTAL DOWN PAYMENT (TO LINE 2) 
AMOUNT 
S 'fee? 75 5 y ^ o ' '~»\ 
SCHEDULE OF UNEQUAL PAYMENTS 
DUE I AMOUNT 
ZTu^fe. &JW 




(3) UNPAID BALANCEOFCASH PRICE J ,Q , - , v . 
(Hem I K e n 2) / / t.^jCJJ 
^r 
TQTAl (MUST EQUAL LINE *) 
BUYER PROMISES TO PAY THE TOTAL OF PAYMENTS (LINE 9) TO THE ORDER 
OF THE SELLER AS SHOWN IN THE ABOVE SCHEDULE OR IN foT\ 
EQUAL tAiWihN •• *"'J *~ . INSTALLMENTS OF $ ^3JZjL^TEACH 
Ja 19 ^ / 
(7) UNPAID BALANCE which is the 
AMOUNT FINANCED(item5^terr 
THE FIRST OF WHICH SHALL BE DUE ON r^» / / * * . (~ 19 ?>, J ANn 
THE LAST O N /VlAy 6> 19 ?v£> 
THE UNDERSIGNED BUYER HEREBY GRANTS TO SELLER A PURCHASE MONEY 
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY TOGETHER WITH ALL 
REPAIRS REPLACEMENTS AND ACCESSORIES NOW OR HEREAFTER APPERTAIN 
ING THERETO UNTIL ALL INDEBTEDNESS DUE HEREUNDER IS/PAID IN FULL 
IN THE tVENT ANY SUCH PAYMENT BECOMES DELINQUENT AND SUCH 
DELINQUENCY SHALL HAVE CONTINUED FOR MORE THAN 10 DAYS THE BUYER 
AGREES TO PAY A DELINQUENCY CHARGE IN AN AMOUNT WHICH IS THE LESSER 
OF 5% OF THE DELINQUENT PAYMENT OR $6 50 OR SUCH OTHER MAXIMUM 
AS IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW 
IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT UNDER ANY TERM OR PROVISION OF THIS CON 
TRACT SELLER MAY DECLARE THE ENTIRE UNPAID BALANCE IMMEDIATELY DUE 
AND PAYABLE WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE AND BUYER CONSENTS THAT SELLER 
OR ITS ASSIGNS MAY TAKE BACK THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY WITHOUT A 
COURT HEARING AND WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO BUYER 
IN THE EVENT OF PREPAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS HEREIN BUYER WILL 
RECEIVE A REBATE OF THE UNEARNED PORTION OF THE FINANCE CHARGE 
COMPUTED BY THE SUM OF THE DIGITS METHOD COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE 
RULE OF 78 SUBJECT TO A RETENTION OF A MINIMUM FINANCE CHARGE IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $5 WHEN THE AMOUNT FINANCED DOES NOT EXCEED $75 00 
OR $7 50 WHEN THE AMOUNT FINANCED EXCEEDS $75 00 WHERE THE REBATE 
IS LESS THAN $1 00 NO REFUND WILL BE GIVEN 
INSURANCE AUTHORIZATION-READ BEFORE SIGNING 
BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT 1) CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE IS NOT REQUIRED BY THE SELLER IN CONNECT 
ION WITH THISTOHWAQT2) AS STATED IN ITEM 6 HEREIN THE COST OF (PREMIUM FOR) (a) DECREASING TERM SINGLEJJBE*1NSURANCE 




PRODUCTS TO RF DFII\.FBFr> / ? / / < £ / ' • / ' ? ' / 
• O^rlW 7 ' ' 
ANALYSIS OF SALE 
(1) CASH PRICE S ?i,6(Xf 
(2) CASH D O W N PAYMFNT j/.*jtY)L 
TRADE IN 
TOTAL DOWN PAYMENT //rc^fc 
(4) UNPAID BALANCE 
O N PRIOR CONTRACT . 
LESS UNEARNfD 
FINANCE CHARGE 
NET BALANCE O N 
PRIOR CONTRACT 
) CONSOLIDATED BALANCE 
( I tem 3 M l e m 4) ±t^m 
(6) OTHER CHARGES 
OFFICIAL FEES/ 
NON FILING PREMIUM 
INSURANCE PREMIUMS 
(See Author ration below) 
SINGLE DECREASING TERM LIFE 
JOINT DECREASING TERM LIFE 
R E I R O A C f l V E DISABILITY 
P E R S O N A L PROPERTY 
(Seller * Interest) 
TOTAL OF OTHER CHARGES 
(8 ) FINANCE CHARGE 
(T me charge) 7%^- £ y 
(9) TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
(Mem 74 -Hem 6) 
(10) DEFERRED PAYMENT PRICE 
( I tem 1 -H tem 4 4-1 tern 6 + - l l e m 8) 
(11) ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
RATE ML 
FINANCE CHARGE 
BEGINS M*y 1 9 5 / 
IS. _AND (d) PERSON IPERTY INSURANCE IS_ _IF OBTAINED THR£>W : S LLER 3) BUYER MAY 
OBTAIN THE INSURANCE THROUGH A PERSON OFlTrS^HQOSING OR THROUGH AN EXISTINGJ^€T"lNSURANCE PROVIDED BY THE BUY 
ER MAY BE REJECTED BY SELLER FOR REASONABLE CAUSE BEFCmE-C^EDIT IS EXTENDED^M-^TsiGNING DIRECTLY BELOW BUYER HEREBY 
ELECTS TO OBTAIN THE INSURANCE INDICATED BY THE PREMIUMS STTCTttUbLJJEMTHEREIN AND AUTHORIZES THE SELLER TO OBTAIN THE 
SAME ON BUYER S BEHALF 5) BUYER HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF THE^0fTt*EOF>*«eOSFn iNSHPAWrc ow TWP i>e\/co$E $'DE O c S'JVE1 C 
COPY OF THIS CONTRACT 6) ONLY THE BUYER (OR BUYER^S4N"!HT CASE OF JOINT INsTfc*NCJi}WHOSE SIGNATURE(S) APPEARS DIRECTLY 
BELOW WILL BE INSURED AND 7) PERSONAJ^RiDPWfTiNSURANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE UNLESS/TH^VAijJE OF THE PROPERTY IS $390 00 OR 
MORE AND THE AMOUNT FINANC^O4S--$^90 00 OR MORE 8) UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THE ^ETfM^QF THE INSURANCE IS THE 
SAME AS THE TERM QEJ*+e-CONTRACT 
BUY. 
BUYER SIGNATURE 
_ DATE _ 
DATE AGE 
NOTICE TO THE BUYER 1 DO NOT SIGN THIS CONTRACT BEFORE YOU READ IT OR IF IT CONTAINS ANY BUNK SPACES 
2 YOU ARE ENTITLED TO AN EXACT AND COMPLFTELY FILLED IN COPY OF THE CONTRACT YOU SIGN 3 UNDER THE LAW YOU 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO PAY OFF IN ADVANCE HIE TULL AMOUNT DUE AND TO OBTAIN A PARTIAL REFUND OF THE FINANCE 
CHARGE SERVICE CHARGE OR TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAl 
BUYER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES RECBPT OF AN EXACT AND COMPLETFLY FILLED IN COPY OF THIS RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT 





.( /rL<- 1 SIGN HE*C»X 
TNER/OR OrFICIA i / I 
-& 
B U Y E R S C O P Y 
T H I S C O N T R A C T I N C L U D E S T H E A D D I T I O N A L T E R M S O N T H E REVERSE S I D E 
jr-saia T UfVl 
